STRATEGIC EFFECT

The concept of 'Centres of Gravity,' first espoused by Clausewitz as a way of describing how to compel an opponent in conflict or war to bend to your will, has stood the test of time. In Clausewitz's day, he believed the enemy's army to be the 'hub of all power;' now an opponent's centre of gravity may take many forms and often different degrees of accessibility. What is clear, however, is far from being limited to the physical destruction of targets with high explosives, we now seek to achieve strategic effect on target sets.

The ability of air power to reach, disrupt or possibly destroy an opponent's strategic or operational centre of gravity suggests that air power is inherently capable of military action with strategic effect. That effect may be created through independent, distinct action or through joint or multinational activity operating in cadence with other forces. Throughout the history of air power, air platforms and their associated weapon systems have been able to carry the fight to the enemy.

 

 

'People have preferred to feel, rather than know, about Strategic Bombing.'

- Dr Noble Frankland
Buccaneer Pavespike, Al Madinah


Loading of 12000Ib bomb onto LancasterLoading of 12000Ib bomb onto Lancaster
Loading of 12000Ib bomb onto LancasterLoading of 12000Ib bomb onto LancasterLoading of 12000Ib bomb onto Lancaster
 
'Bomber Harris' Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Commander in Chief of Bomber Command 1942-1945
 

On a not-so-sunny day in January 1991, 208 Squadron was minding its own business on exercise out of RAF St Mawgan with the Navy, when the Western Coalition went to war over Kuwait (part of 208 Squadrons old stamping ground!). On 23rd January, the Squadron was called back to RAF Lossiemouth and ordered to deploy to Muharraq (where it spent its last days as a part of Air Forces Gulf just 20 years before). Now the task was to support Operation GRANBY, an element of DESERT STORM. The Royal Air Force moved with a speed of decision and action not witnessed since World War II as 2 'desert pink' Buccaneers flew out to Muharraq on 26th January, followed by 2 more the next day and another 2 on the 28th. Finally, 12 aircraft and 18 crews were located in Bahrain. They flew with such aircraft names as 'Glenfiddich,' 'The Macallan,' 'Glen Elgin,' 'Famous Grouse' and 'Tamnavoulin.'

During February 1991, 107 sorties were flown without a single mechanical mishap. Initially, the Buccaneers laser targeted for the Tornado GR1s of other squadrons, including bridges, fuel / oil depots, airfields, hardened aircraft shelter sites and storage bunkers. Interestingly, the Buccaneer flew higher, faster and further than its counterpart. The laser designation of targets worked perfectly and not one sortie was lost. Then 208 Squadron came into its own, carrying its own laser-guided bombs as well as the laser designator. In a press conference before the Buccaneers arrived in the Gulf, it was asked of Tom King (the Defence Minister at the time) 'why are we sending a 30-year old aeroplane to a high-tech war?' The answer came back: 'To increase the accuracy of the precision bombing!' - and that is exactly what it did.